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 In 1940 the United States faced the looming threat of another global conflict while 
still recovering from a debilitating economic depression. The American government acted 
quickly and established numerous federal programs designed to meet foreseeable needs of 
the nation across a wide spectrum of categories. One such program established in 1940 
was the Engineering, Science, and Management War Training Program designed to rapidly 
produce scientific and technical specialists for crucial defense industries. A distinct 
attribute of the program was the diversity of its participants due to the prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or age. This allowed for traditionally excluded 
groups such as women and people of color to participate in industries and educational 
fields in which they were historically not prevalent. This thesis explains both the impact of 
the program on its participants and the general war effort as well as federal involvement in 
education and training during the wartime years. This analysis is achieved through 
evaluation of official government publications, historical newspaper articles, past 
dissertations written on related subjects, and more recently published books providing 
supplemental information. Ultimately, this work aims to contribute to a more 
comprehensive account of the ESMWT program’s impact on its participants, the general 







The Second World War was a time of upheaval politically, socially, and culturally for 
many nations across the world and the United States was no exception. The American 
economy had only recently begun to climb out of the shadow of the Great Depression and 
the looming possibility of involvement in WWII required the mobilization of not only the 
people and manufacturing, but also of higher education.  Massive industrial production and 
technological superiority would be necessary for the United States to both compete and 
win against the Axis powers. The number of highly educated and trained technical 
personnel who could be mobilized for these efforts was vastly insufficient. As a result, plans 
were created for a program designed to streamline the training of these required personnel 
utilizing the already existing universities and colleges across the nation. 
The Engineering, Science, and Management War Training (ESMWT) program was a 
government sponsored program during the years 1940-1945 which provided college-level 
classes to Americans in order to train them quickly to fill vital engineering and managerial 
positions in civilian defense industries. The ESMWT program offered these classes at 
universities and colleges across the nation to all Americans regardless of their sex, race, or 
color.  It is clear the valuable training conducted within these classes not only made a 
meaningful contribution to the war effort, but also offered opportunities to those who had 
been traditionally excluded. Given how successful the program was, including the 
cooperation within the program between the federal government and institutions of higher 
education it is unsurprising that substantial benefits for education and training were later 
included in the G.I. Bill.  
 The “War to End All Wars” at the beginning of the 20th century saw the invention 
and use of killing machines that had once only been possible in the theoretical. Aircraft, 
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rapid-firing machine guns, chemical weaponry, tanks, and numerous other advancements 
experienced their first wide-spread and effective use during the war and left a lasting 
impression on its participants and spectators alike. The First World War had shown the 
world that the future of warfare would be one of mechanization and destruction on a 
massive scale.  When the flames of war once again began to spread across the globe in the 
1930s, the American government knew that if those conflicts escalated, the nation would 
eventually be involved in some manner and they must be prepared for this eventuality. Still 
recovering from the debilitating effects of the Great Depression, the government was aware 
that labor and resources had to be used effectively in order to fight a war abroad as well as 
maintain what stability had been created on the home front.  To facilitate this endeavor 
numerous government programs were created to plan for the wartime demands for 
everything from bullets and beans to childcare and airplanes. For the nation to be prepared 
for war the United States military would require a two-ocean navy, fifty thousand 
airplanes, and a million and half men strong mechanized army.12  
In order to meet these demands, the country would first need to  possess the 
necessary shipyards, plants, as well as the required engineers to create and operate within 
these facilities. While shipyards and plants already existed, or could be built quickly, and 
additional civilian factories could be repurposed for military use, the number of engineers 
required to run the operations was not something that could be supplied immediately. A 
deficit of engineers already existed in civilian industries and the number of students 
 
1 Herluf V. Olsen, National Defense and the Collegiate Schools of Business. In American 
Association of Collegiate Schools of Business Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Meeting 
(University of Minnesota, 1941), 69. 
2 U.S. Department of State, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 
1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943), 525-31. 
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graduating from engineering universities would not nearly be enough to meet the 
requirements for military demand on top of that.3 For example a study conducted pre-war 
found that “in the Pittsburgh area there were only 257 engineers qualified for the kinds of 
production engineering envisioned, a tenth of the anticipated need”.4 As a result, planning 
began for a program which would facilitate the training of engineers and other specialists 
who would be essential for manufacturing and other wartime tasks. It was decided that this 
program would be sponsored by the U.S. Office of Education due to the level of training 
required and on October 9th, 1940 was established as the Engineering Defense Training 
(EDT) program, though commonly referred to as the ESMWT program.5 
Background 
The First World War 
The development and recognition of the need for training like the Engineer, Science, 
and Management War Training (ESMWT) program was directly based on lessons learned 
and seeds planted from America’s involvement in the First World War. Prior to President 
Wilson’s request to congress for a declaration of war, the Office of Education and other 
Federal agencies had continued working the previous two years as though business was 
usual.6 Although, for the Office of Education, this was primarily due to lack of resources 
rather than the belief that America would not be involved in the war. As a result no 
 
3 U.S. Office of Education, and Henry H Armsby, Engineering Science and Management War 
Training Final Report. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 7. 
4 Virgus R. Cardozier, Colleges And Universities In World War II. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 
1993), 185. 
5 Ibid, 11. 
6 Richard Wayne Lykes, Higher Education And the United States Office of Education (1867-




planning for any training programs had been created prior to U.S. involvement and there 
was “consequently little time to prepare”.7 During the war, the Office of Education mainly 
concerned itself with publication of propaganda, evaluation of the war’s effects on 
American schools, and fostering good-will with foreign nations through educational 
material swaps.8 However, Dr. Hollis Godfrey, the Commissioner for Engineering and 
Education and member of the Advisory Committee under the Council of National Defense, 
did publish a statement in 1917 detailing some of his objectives. 
With the entrance of the United States into the war it became desirable to establish a 
common policy of cooperation between the higher institutions and the Government ,a 
policy which would result in the fullest utilization of higher educational resources of the 
country for national defense and service.9 
 
This appears to be the first formulation of the idea of a cooperative engineering 
training program between the federal government and facilities of higher education. 
Godfrey’s committee members were chosen from representatives of these facilities and all 
were extremely willing and enthusiastic to work on such a program. However, nothing ever 
came to fruition from this committee or the plans laid because though there was a 
recognized need for technical training of men by the War Department, the program which 
was discussed simply never existed.10 Historian Richard Lykes states that the failure for 
any implementation of this theoretical program came down to two main factors. His first 
point was that the length of the war was simply too short for any “comprehensive program 
to be organized and put into operation”.11 The lack of any real preparation by the Office of 
 
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid, 66. 
9  Lykes, Higher Education And the United States Office of Education (1867-1953), 67. 
10  Ibid, 73. 
11 Ibid, 78. 
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Education meant there were no plans or resources that could be utilized for an engineering 
training program of any significant size. The second factor was the failure of both the 
government and universities to see the value and need of a program for “controlled 
production of skilled and educated manpower”.12 Lykes attributes this to a combination of 
the freshness of the total war concept, the general reluctance of federal officials to interfere 
with facilities of higher education, and “the deep-rooted tradition of academic freedom”.13 
Even with no program ever being truly devised, the war still had massive benefits for the 
Office of Education and made headway for the future 
cooperation between federal educational leaders and 
colleges and universities. The most important conclusion 
which Lykes arrives at was that “the war showed that 
higher education was vital to national defense”.14  
During WWI engineering colleges had been utilized 
by the United States Army for vocational training, yet this 
training was primarily concerned with mechanics and little 
training was actually done on an engineering level.15 As 
Figure 1 displays, the training for “engineers” during WW1 
was not concerned with supervisory, research, or fine 
technical positions which engineers from higher educational 
facilities could fill. This was regarded as poor utilization of the schools by professional 
 
12 Ibid 
13 Lykes, Higher Education And the United States Office of Education (1867-1953), 79. 
14 Ibid 
15 U.S. Office of Education and Henry H Armsby, Engineering Science and Management War 
Training Final Report, 8. 
Fig. 1  
An example of the various 
occupations for which some training 
was conducted during WW1 
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engineers and it wasted valuable instruction opportunities for training engineers. Although 
the modernization and mechanization effort of armies increased during WW1, the war was 
finished before engineers were really needed on a significant scale for production or 
research requirements.  However, the technological and tactical failures of certain 
strategies and armies during WW1 proved that warfare must adapt, and large numbers of 
scientists and engineers would be  essential for constant improvement of weapon and 
industrial technologies. As Henry Armsby, special advisor to the ESMWT program, 
observed, “In the first world war machines were introduced to aid the efforts of the armed 
forces. In modern warfare it can be said without exaggeration that without machines 
organized military effort is completely ineffective against a mechanized enemy”.16 The scale 
of the global conflict also necessitated an evaluation of production facilities for standard 
goods, weaponry, and machines in order to guarantee that the necessary output could be 
provided and maintained consistently.  The federal government had made multiple 
mistakes during WW1 when it came to utilizing higher education facilities and educated 
persons. The first major mistake was waiting too long to begin defense training programs 
and the second was the drafting of educated persons for military service when they could 
be better utilized in the occupation they were trained for. 
 In the years between the First and Second World War there was a large increase in 
the number of vocational and trade schools with over a thousand public ones in existence 
by 1940.  The hope was that these schools would be used for their relevant training in 
mechanics and other basics, leaving the more advanced engineering schools free to 





United States and by 1940 the United States’ government “was much bigger and more 
powerful than it had been in 1932”.17  The Office of Education itself had not undergone 
significant change or had any real developments until 1934 when the National Youth 
Administration (NYA) was established under the Works Progress Administration (WPA). 
Though this program did have the Office working with facilities of higher education, there 
is nothing of significance when it came to engineering that occurred until 1940 when 
planning began for an engineering training program. Unlike WW1, federal leaders made 
extensive preparations prior to official American involvement in WW2 and early economic 
mobilization began in the late 1930s.  
Mobilization 
Public-Private Mobilization 
 Mobilization for the Second World War was dictated by the government and by the 
private sector. Corporate America had to be mobilized for the war alongside the military, 
for this was a conflict which necessitated complete commitment. Early on there were 
disagreements about how the recovering economy and manufacturing power of the United 
States should be utilized. Some remembered the large profits corporations were able to 
reap in WW1 and hoped that tighter government control would curtail big business’ 
gains.18 On the other side there were those who believed that private industry should 
produce war material and the majority of the production with the government footing the 
bill and “otherwise staying out of the way”.19 The end result was something of a mixture 
 
17 John W Jeffries, Wartime America: The World War II Home Front. (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 
1996), 17 
18 Wilson, Destructive Creation : American Business and the Winning of World War II, 44 
19  Ibid, 44 
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between the two views with contracts and production orders handed out to businesses by 
federal officers, but the U.S. government still supervised and guided the overall industrial 
mobilization. GOCO (Government Owned, Contractor Operated) facilities are one of the 
finest examples of this public-private synergism.20  
While pre-war industrial mobilization had largely involved midsize contractors, the 
increasing usage of the GOCO plants in the early 1940s saw some of the nation’s largest 
industrial corporations building and operating these facilities.21 The GOCO facilities were 
almost entirely funded through public dollars and leased out to contractors to operate and 
use for production of war material, often being sold to the same companies post-war for 
small amounts relative to their cost.22 The contracting companies dealt with only small 
operating costs and did not have to put forward capital for a new facility which was an 
enticing enough prospect for many companies to happily assist production efforts  in the 
defense industries. This compromise led to a huge output of industrial production and 
although the government “rose slowly and imperfectly” to the challenges presented by 
mobilization they were “ultimately successfully”.23 The ESMWT program was constructed 
on a similar idea where the government would pay for the operating costs created by the 
classes, but the classes were provided and taught by the educational facilities’ staff.  The 
institution also received similar benefits post-war as the GOCO facilities, as I will discuss 
further later.  
Appeals for Patriotism and Sacrifice 
 
20 Ibid, 56 
21 Ibid, 55 
22 Ibid, 208 
23 Jeffries, Wartime America: The World War II Home Front., 18 
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 World War II required economic, industrial, and labor mobilization on a nation-wide 
scale. Only three months into the nation’s entry into war, it became evident that victory 
would require the involvement of every person and “total commitment” to the war effort.24 
American propaganda focused on “patriotism” in order to create support for the war and 
maintain morale on the home-front. Some propagandists attempted to sell the war through 
the citizen’s obligation to the state’s defense or by showing the threats that opposing  
nations could pose to Americans if they should win and then inevitably force their rival 
ideology upon them. 25 The individualism of man, and especially Americans, meant that the 
war had to be sold in a fashion which brought it home to the viewer. Norman Rockwell’s 
famous “Four Freedoms” is a fine example of one type of this propaganda as it brought to 
mind the obligation to family and showed what Americans were fighting to preserve. While 
normally the state should operate for its citizens’ protection, WWII made necessary for 
citizens to work for the state’s protection.  
The conditions of the war made it necessary for Americans from all walks of life to 
sacrifice certain standards or luxuries. The demands of the wartime economy necessitated 
the curtailing of production of civilian goods and rationing was implemented to control 
resources vital to war industries. Civilians were further encouraged to participate in the 
war effort through things like Victory Gardens, bond drives, and scrap collection. Freedom 
and Patriotism were keywords in selling the war as no person wanted to appear “Un-
 
24 Lewis A Erenberg and Susan E Hirsch. The War in American Culture: Society and 
Consciousness during World War II. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1996), 24. 
25Robert B. Westbrook, Why We Fought: Forging American Obligations in World War II. 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2004), 40. 
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American” through their own perceived selfishness. Images such as 
those appearing in Figure 2 were widespread across the home front 
as propagandists put their best effort towards selling the war and 
enticing sacrifice. This “sacrifice” also included the need for large-
scale recruitment of women for labor positions and wartime 
programs due to the holes in manpower left by the implementation 
of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.   
The Engineering, Science, and War Management 
Training Program 
The defeat of multiple Allied nations in the early years of the war due to 
the success of the modernized German military made it clear that the war would not be 
short and victory would require all of America’s industrial and technological power. Henry 
Armsby was the Specialist in Engineering Education for the Office of Education for most of 
the wartime years and in the ESMWT program’s final report, he stated that even by 1940 
“warfare had become a test of the relative total scientific, engineering, and manufacturing 
skills and capacities of the belligerent nations.”26 The nation was mobilizing both in 
warfare and industry as the United States created industrial expansion plans for dockyards, 
factories and other facilities.  
Early on in this planning they realized their “most critical bottleneck in the national 
defense effort” was the lack of engineers and technicians required for the “planning, 
 
26 U.S. Office of Education and Henry H Armsby, Engineering Science and Management War 




production, operation, management, and research” of the entire defense effort.27 With this 
need identified and the deficit too great to overcome even with accelerated graduation of 
engineering students in university, the Office of Education set to devising a program which 
could produce technicians and fill the needed engineer roles quickly. The vocational 
schools developed in the Interwar period were believed able to provide training for trade-
school and secondary school level, but the fields in this program requiring advanced 
instruction for engineering would require the usage of existing engineering colleges and 
their infrastructure.28 Taking note of lessons learned from previous experience in WW1, 
the plans were laid for the actual program itself in late 1940 under the working name of the 
Engineer Defense Training (EDT) program as engineer training is all it was initially 
concerned with. The goals of the program changed as the nation’s needs did, but when  first 
developed the primary goal was simply for a program which provided “courses designed to 
meet the shortage of engineers with specialized training in fields essential to the national 
defense”.29 The success of the program in initially meeting this goal and the arising need for 
training in similar fields saw two more categories added as the war progressed, science and 
management. The title was changed to include these and the word Defense was also 
changed to War in 1943 making the final title The Engineering, Science, and Management 
War Training (ESMWT) program which is what the program is almost always referred to as 







conduct training to meet the shortage of engineers, chemists, physicists, and production 
supervisors in fields essential to the national defense”.30 
Mobilization of Education 
 In World War I college and university officials were enthusiastic about assisting in 
the war effort and were very willing to work with the federal government. However, as 
discussed previously the federal government had not planned well enough to properly 
utilize the higher education facilities or have the time to enact a working program.31 In 
WW2, universities and colleges decided to be ready even before they were called upon. As 
the federal government laid plans for defense training programs, individual institutions 
were establishing their own defense committees. These defense committees were 
established to perform certain functions which included the “cataloging of ways in which 
each campus could contribute to the defense effort” and setting “priorities for each 
institution in serving each need”.32 These defense committees made the implementation 
and beginning of the ESMWT program occur much quicker when compared to similar 
program planning in WW1 and no doubt made federal cooperation with higher education 
much easier. These committees were widespread as well with an estimated 200 
institutions having a defense committee in Fall 1940 which no doubt helped facilitate the 
implementation of the ESMWT program on a nationwide scale.33  
Autonomy of Education 
 
30 U.S. Office of Education and Henry H Armsby, Engineering Science and Management War 
Training, Final Report, 75 
31 Lykes, Higher Education And the United States Office of Education (1867-1953), 70 




 One of the founding policies and beliefs of the ESMWT program was that it would be 
a program of the institutions assisted by the Office of Education, not a program of the Office 
of Education assisted by the institutions.34  This was partially due to the fact that college 
officials remained “bitter about the fact that when the military services did call on higher 
education in World War I, they virtually took control of campuses.”35 It is also because 
many of the staff members in the beginning and further on were almost always deans, 
professors, or professional engineers themselves and were not looking to remove 
institutional autonomy. It was hoped that this strategy of minimizing federal control would 
lead to the greatest possible output as each school would develop the program in the 
manner which best fit them. In accordance with this general strategy of respecting the 
autonomy of the institutions, the decision was made to not overrule the school’s existing 
policies and the rights granted to them by their respective charters. This level of autonomy 
was also necessary due to the size and scope of the program which the small staff in the 
Division of Higher Education would not have been able to handle.  
Organization 
The original plan for the program called for 14,000,000 dollars which “would make 
it possible to provide for the training in engineering colleges of about 58,000 people for an 
average training period of approximately 3 months each.”36 The founders of the program 
believed that initial funding would be granted and as such planned their organization on a 
larger scale than this number represents. The program was broken down into groups of 
 
34 U.S. Office of Education and Henry H Armsby, Engineering Science and Management War 
Training, Final Report, IX 
35 Cardozier, Colleges And Universities In World War II, 20 
36 U.S. Office of Education and Henry H Armsby, Engineering Science and Management War 
Training, Final Report, 12 
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staff, one field staff and one central staff. The central staff was in Washington and focused 
on administrative tasks on a national level such as working with other government 
agencies, publishing program material, and preparing course guidelines.37 The field staff 
worked with the colleges and universities to evaluate the needs of the local industries and 
“supervised the training programs in the field”.38 In order to run the program on a nation-
wide level the country was divided in 22 regional areas with each region having an 
appointed advisor. This advisor was then responsible for forming their own regional 
committee made up of representatives for the institutions in his or her area which would 
coordinate the program’s training.39 The first regional advisors “were recognized leaders in 
engineering education”  who worked for no compensation and were mostly left to their 
own devices.40 Each region was responsible for contacting the industries in their area and 
determining  the respective training needs, but in order for the class to be approved and 
funding allocated it was required for them to contact the federal staff through the regional 
committee.  
Two hundred and twenty-seven institutions officially offered classes as part of the 
program and the total number of trainees was 1,795,716 at a total cost of $59,967,065 
(around $870 million today).41 The actual number of institutions was likely much higher as 
many institutions often subcontracted to other schools which were not approved. Some of 
the most common usages were the renting of classroom space or borrowing of faculty for 
 
37 Ibid, 14 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 
40 U.S. Office of Education and Henry H Armsby, Engineering Science and Management War 
Training, Final Report, 16 
41 Ibid, 36 
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instruction.42 Enrollment peaked between 1942-1943 when the number of trainees was 
around 600,000 taking almost 13,000 classes offered at 214 institutions across the United 
States.43 Although science and management classes were offered after 1941, the focus of 
the program remained engineering for the entire duration. 75% of enrollments were for 
engineering courses, production supervision was second at 21%, and chemistry and 
physics both around 2%.44 General guidelines were published by the Washington staff for 
common need classes, for example radio engineering, but the classes were different at each 
institution as specific training procedures were decided by the school. 
Training 
 From the beginning, the program’s founders made it clear that they were not 
attempting to create fully qualified professional engineers, instead they were trying to “give 
specific, intensive training to meet specific and definitely determined needs of defense and 
war industries.”45 To create an engineer from a fresh high school graduate would take as 
much 7 to 8 years due to the education required, years which the United States did not 
have. Instead the plan was to take some of the less essential tasks which would normally be 
done by college graduates and supplement them instead with people supplied with the 
minimum training needed to fulfill their specific task.  In this way occupations such as 
inspector, laboratory technician, or draftsman could be filled by prepared individuals even 
if those people had “little or no education in related fields”.46 The other common form of 
 
42 Cardozier, Colleges And Universities In World War II, 176 
43 U.S. Office of Education and Henry H Armsby, Engineering Science and Management War 
Training, Final Report, 45 
44 Lykes, Higher Education And the United States Office of Education (1867-1953),131-132 
45 U.S. Office of Education and Henry H Armsby, Engineering Science and Management War 




training offered was the retraining of one type of engineer to another more in demand field, 
e.g. a mechanical engineer to an ordinance inspector.  Having minimally trained personnel 
take up the lesser tasks would free the better educated engineers for this retraining 
process or allow them to focus on the positions most vital to the defense industries. The 
number of personnel being trained and funding given to the institutions made an 
immediate impact to their respective campuses as they had been dealing with decreasing 
enrollment since even before U.S. entry into the war. 
Campus Change 
 As the United States ramped up for war in 1939-1941 there was a decline in male 
enrollment across higher educational facilities. A large portion of this can actually be 
attributed to men leaving college for civilian jobs in “manufacturing, in the construction of 
military camps, and in other sectors of the economy”.47 Although the draft was the cause of 
some men having to leave college or postpone their enrollment, more men left for these 
civilian jobs than entered the military in Fall 1941.48 By 1942, the enrollment of male 
students was down 20%-70% at various institutions across the nation and the loss of 
income associated with this enrollment decline no doubt caused universities to be much 
more open to offering defense training courses. The ESMWT program provided many 
benefits for the universities and colleges which hosted courses and often by the end of the 
war these schools had improved in several ways. Similar to GOCO facilities in industrial 
mobilization, the most concrete benefit of educational mobilization was the ownership for 
the institutions of equipment bought for the courses. The ESWMT program was intended to 
 




have no financial loss incurred on the behalf of the participating schools and so any 
equipment deemed necessary for the courses was paid for by the government. Some 
institutions did take some monetary loss as they did not always request funding for some 
ventures, but it is believed that this was partially “for patriotic reasons”.49 Universities and 
colleges were willing to sacrifice space and money for the war effort that the entire nation 
was devoted to. This did not go without notice and a month after V-E day it was decided 
that when the program was ended, the equipment purchased should be granted to the 
institution that used it.50 The total amount spent on equipment over the course of the 
program was $3,386,793 dollars (almost $50 million today) which includes both 
equipment bought and equipment rented.51 Nevertheless, this was a significant amount for 
some institutions and represented a real impact for their future student’s education.  There 
was also an increased level of cooperation between institutions with schools sharing their 
difficulties so others could learn, loaning faculty for instruction, and the sharing of new 
training techniques.52 The institutions were united in their efforts and were not competing 
for students, but instead competing to win the war. The new training techniques had to be 
developed because of the new format of classes, the industrial focus, and the demographics 
of the trainees. 94% of trainees were already working in the industries they were receiving 
training for and as a result many classes took place in the evening or night which led to 
many people seeing the “need and value of night school” offered by the colleges.53 Classes 
 
49  Ibid, 124 
50 U.S. Office of Education and Henry H Armsby, Engineering Science and Management War 
Training, Final Report, 15 
51 Ibid, 121 
52 Ibid, 68 
53 Ibid, 65 
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were also longer, featured more student participation in discussion, and used “problem 
material directly from industry”.54 The direct training for specific tasks also made 
educators notice that it was not always necessary for certain prerequisites to be completed. 
For example, students could learn about thermodynamics even with no prior course in 
calculus and still perform their duties to the standard.55 The demographics of the classes 
also influenced colleges as instructors learned to teach to groups they may not have 
interacted with on the same scale. The major non-traditional groups in defense training 
were women and African Americans. Women for the most part trained much the same as 
men and were well received in both their schooling and industrial positions. African 
Americans on the other hand suffered from the racial bias inherent in mainstream society 
and faced numerous difficulties in even just participating in the program. 
Non-Traditional Recruits 
Just as general industrial labor shortages required the inclusion of women on a 
hitherto unseen scale, programs like the ESMWT also required concessions to be made on 
the type of recruits who would be accepted.  Notably, this general shortage likely 
influenced a part of what makes the ESMWT program so extraordinary which was its 
prohibition of discrimination of any participants based on their race, age, or sex.  In the 
United States, the wartime boom offered women and Africans Americans new 
opportunities and radical change on a number of fronts. The ESMWT program was quite 
progressive regarding the makeup of its membership and the Congressional Act which saw 
 
54 Ibid, 68 
55 U.S. Office of Education and Henry H Armsby, Engineering Science and Management War 
Training, Final Report, 68 
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its creation made it clear who was able to participate. When asked about discrimination 
within the program there was the same answer in each of the yearly “Answers to 
Questions” publications about the program put out by the Office of Education: 
The Act specifies that “No Trainee *** shall be discriminated against because of sex, 
race, or color, and, where separate schools are required by law for separate 
population groups to the extent needed for trainees of each such group equitable 
provisions shall be made for facilities and training of like color.56 
This meant that the program would not only run and fund defense training classes for men, 
but also for women and other non-traditional students. However, even with this concession 
it was still up to the individual schools on who they would choose to admit as the 
publication would explain immediately after that answer. Although many schools opened 
their doors to previously barred groups, schools still retained autonomy when it came to 
admission.57  
Women for the Program 
At the time, there was a belief held by some that most women in higher education 
were only there to find a husband and that they were not truly there for educational 
purposes. With the United States’ entry into the war and all the nation’s effort being put 
towards the war, women were sometimes criticized for their choice of study. An example of 
 
56 United States, Federal Security Agency, U. S. Office of Education. (1941). “Answers to 
Questions Pertaining To Engineering, Science, and Management Defense Training Program". 
Washington. 
57 U.S. Office of Education and Henry H Armsby, Engineering Science and Management War 
Training, Final Report, 45 
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this opinion is shown in Figure 3 and, although condescending, it displays the view held by 
some that women were not applying themselves to the war 
effort as much as they should be. In addition, “A study by the 
American Council on Education claimed that of 100,000 female 
college graduates in 1942, fewer than 30 percent majored in 
subjects that were directly applicable to war needs.”58 The 
ESMWT program therefore was a way in which women could 
take classes relevant to the war effort, even if they did not have 
the required background normally needed.  
Even more so, official publications put out by the 
administrators for the program often encouraged the recruitment of 
women. Like other programs, women were encouraged to participate in 
the ESMWT program due to their exemption from the Selective Service Act.  In fact, one 
document even stated that “efforts to recruit and train for war industries must necessarily 
be directed primarily to women and men who are not likely to be inducted.”59 In the first 
year of the ESMWT program female enrollment was only 841 out of a total of 120,802 
students, however by fiscal year 1942 enrollment had grown to 130,245 leading to a ratio 
where 1 in 6 trainees were women.60 The reason for this increased enrollment can be 
attributed to two factors. First there was a drop in male availability for ESMWT classes due 
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to the draft and other male only selections limiting the pool of available males. Second, the 
program expanded after its first year to include administration and management roles that 
did not require as extensive technical knowledge. Courses which fell into this category, 
such as “personnel administration, inspection and testing, communications, etc.” had high 
enrollments of women as they did not require prior knowledge or training in engineering.61 
White women were happily received because most of those who participated in the classes 
had not been involved with relevant war work prior and few had training in engineering or 
scientific knowledge. Therefore they were one of the best candidate groups because 
through training they could be put into positions where they could begin to aid the general 
war effort and the training provided to them would actually make a measurable impact. Of 
the women trained as part of the ESMWT program “nearly all of them found employment in 
war industries at jobs customarily assigned to men.”62  
The women in these positions obviously made impacts in the industries they were 
assigned to through production, management, and other tasks but they also did more. The 
282,235 women who filled positions of technical, scientific, and managerial need freed 
enough men up to constitute almost 19 military divisions; for scale, the Italian Campaign 
was won using 11 divisions.63 The women who participated in the wide variety of classes 
offered by the ESMWT program were often well received by both their teachers and 
employers.  Regarding women’s performance in the classes as well as in their appointed 
jobs,  they were usually graded equal to that of their male counterparts and sometimes 
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even greater within certain occupations such as drafting.64 Not only did the nation benefit 
from women’s efforts, but the women benefited as well. This example recounts the 
experience of one woman who explains her success and satisfaction after participating in 
the program: 
From Edmonton a girl who intended to be a teacher but who, after Pearl Harbor, took 
ESMWT training as a draftsman at the University of California, writes: "I am the only girl 
in an Engineering Department of 50 men. I am now classified as an Engineering Aide 
and I'm very, very happy not only because of my salary but because I am in the center of 
a scene as dramatic as the Gold Rush of '49 and as hectic as a train terminal at 5 o'clock. 
I am able to feel directly valuable to the war effort and most important of all, I have 
found the groove into which I fit. (Bureau of Training U.S. War Manpower Commision, 
25) 
Women were the most important group of non-traditional recruits and the classes 
given not only aided the war effort, but they also granted the opportunity to some women 
who might not have normally tried the chance to learn they could succeed in higher 
education. The only other group of non-traditional students with a measurable impact 
were blacks, and although their enrollment figures were low there are a variety of societal 
and educational factors which provide explanation. 
Black Americans  
The suppression of discrimination based upon sex removed the barrier to 
participation for the largest amount of people, but the ban of discrimination based on race 
was also a highly progressive maneuver for a national fighting a war with a segregated 
military. Yet even with the opportunity open, the number of black Americans who trained 
in the program only amounted to 25,158 and this low number can be attributed to several 





schools to integrate their classes beyond what law required. The Answers to Questions 
booklet published yearly always included the point that if schools are required by law to 
separate population groups then “to the extent needed for trainees of each such group, 
equitable provisions shall be made for facilities and training of like quality”.65 This policy 
reflected the evasion of the 14th amendment sanctioned by Plessy v Ferguson (1896) which 
allowed “separate, but equal” publication accommodations. This policy likely led to some 
schools turning away black students for a variety of made-up reasons or black students 
deciding not to enroll in such classes due to the likely inferior arrangements which would 
be provided.  
Herman Branson was a black physicist and educator who published an article in the 
Journal of Negro Education in which he discusses his perceived reasons which caused black 
American enrollment to be so low. Branson explains how Pearl Harbor not only brought 
America into the war, but it also opened up America’s social, political, and economic life to 
black Americans in incredible new ways. He states that “Everywhere one met the belief that 
at last the integration of the Negro into American life was not a question of charity or 
abstract democratic principle but a necessity for the full mobilization of our most valuable 
war asset, manpower.”66 His article’s analysis focused on the two popular programs for 
wartime industrial training, the ESMWT and the National Youth Administration (NYA). 
Where the ESMWT required classes to be of college level,  the NYA only required grade 
school education and in 1942 alone had 58,228 black participants, a figure double that of 
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the ESMWT program’s entire black enrollment.67 One of the reasons for this disparity in 
enrollment was the lower rate of educational attainment for blacks compared to whites. In 
April 1940 the percentage of black Americans who were high school graduates was only 
7.7% while whites were almost triple with 26.1%.68 Additionally, The college graduate 
level was even more disproportionate with 4.9% of whites having 4 or more years of 
college compared to only 1.3% of blacks.69 A high school graduate level of education was 
the working minimum for the ESMWT program although most of the program required a 
college level education. Many blacks were thus ineligible for the classes, yet even the ones 
who were eligible faced additional difficulties in attempting to participate in training.   The 
high requirements demanded by the ESMWT program for schools to offer the program’s 
classes eliminated most black schools, although some schools were able to work around 
this by subcontracting through other institutions.70 Additionally, where classes were able 
to be offered to black Americans there were often delays due to the need to bring black 
students up to the level of education required as their inferior and segregated high school 
education had not prepared them well enough, especially in the South. ESMWT training in 
the South was also at times sub-standard and there was clear evidence of inequality in 
training facilities which can be laid at the feet of local officials and their social prejudices. 
Classes “for Negroes” were offered at non-black colleges in the South, but these classes 
were almost never held there. Instead, as in the case of Alabama, they used the facilities 
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located at traditionally black colleges elsewhere in the state.71 
Some examples of black students’ experiences with ESMWT 
courses in the South include situations like a class for “marine 
electricians in a shop where positively the only item of marine 
equipment was an eight-inch length of electrical cable” and “a class 
in motor mechanics where the students were forbidden to go into 
the motors”.72 It is evident through examples like these two that 
the training for black Americans was hampered by a lack of respect 
for their abilities and likely the corruption of officials who misused 
the funding granted to them for these courses.  
Branson places most of the blame for the ESMWT’s lack of a significant number of 
black trainees on the program’s strict requirements, the federal government’s failure to 
train for national need instead of local, and the social prejudice of local officials which 
inhibited training. Branson also held the opinion that the program and black colleges had 
not done enough to recruit black Americans to the scientific aspect of the program and that 
merely training them on the technical aspect of how to operate the machines would “be 
certain to weaken us in the super-scientific world predicted for the post-war period”.73 
There was a tendency among educators to track black Americans into these non-academic 
vocational fields which is likely one of the reasons the NYA, which dealt with more menial 
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not have been as successful as it could have, the final report of the ESMWT program stated 
that the training of blacks did create a “substantial contribution to the war effort” and they 
“contributed their full share to the industrial development of the country”.75  Branson’s 
conclusion was that the underestimation and prejudice of the government towards black 
Americans' abilities meant that the government was throwing away “10 per cent of our 
potential technical brainpower”.76  This underutilization and pigeonholing of black 
Americans into non-technical or academic occupations was not uncommon for this time 
period. It was just another example of the institutionalization of social prejudice and racism 
which was widespread within the United States and it clearly plagued the best efforts of 
black enrollees in the ESMWT program.  Despite all the obstacles in their path, those who 
successfully participated in the program were said to have made a substantial contribution.  
Impact and Importance 
The End of the Program 
 There had been the hope that the ESMWT program would have continued post-war. 
The people participating in the program had been trained to fulfill roles in defense 
industries and with the general demobilization it was believed that the trainees would have 
to be retrained for peacetime activities such making automobiles, highways, or household 
appliances.77 Additionally, the program had only created “large numbers of partially 
trained engineers and supervisors” and these would require further training if they were to 
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do more than simply fill their designated role.78 Instead, the decision to end the program 
was made quite quickly and in January 1945 a telegram was sent to each participating 
institution alerting them that the program would cease operation on June 30th. 
Instructions were also sent detailing what each institution needed to do, and the 
liquidation was completed quickly and smoothly. It wasn’t until a week after the official 
closing of the program that institutions learned they would be allowed to keep the 
equipment from the ESMWT program, provided that the school was using it “in its 
educational or training program”.79 The advisor and committee member positions for each 
region were no longer needed, the supplies and equipment were liquidated, and after a 
final audit and collection of reports the Engineering, Science, and Management War 
Training program ceased to exist.  
It is difficult to easily explain the enormous contribution the ESMWT program made 
to the war effort, because it was often made in immeasurable means. Each person trained 
to fulfill a technical, scientific, or supervisory position not only directly increased output 
through their own work, but also indirectly through the increased efficiency of other 
employees thanks to their presence and training. The intense and rapid modernization of 
the United States Armed Forces could not have been accomplished at the pace and scale 
they were if not for the ESMWT program and other defense training programs. The 
mechanized forces required for the war could only have been produced through the 
sustained strong industrial output which the ESMWT program helped facilitate. Armsby 
makes this fact clear multiple times in his report through numerous quotes taken from 
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industrial executives about the benefits their plants and industries gained through 
ESMWT training of personnel. As further proof that the ESMWT program did in fact make 
a strong contribution to the war effort, a study was conducted in 1944 which found a 
correlation “positive and large enough to be regarded as significant”.80 The success of the 
program led federal officials to clearly see the value of an educated population which 
could be utilized in emergencies to fill needed technical and scientific positions in both 
civilian and military components.  
Long-term Importance 
 The greatest impact that the ESMWT program had was not on industry or the war 
effort, but on the people. 1.5 million men and women were given the chance to return to 
school and take college level classes again, or in some cases for the first time. They were 
able to work in their relevant industries and receive training to improve and develop their 
skills at the same time. Some who had not tried before were surprised that they were able 
to succeed in higher education as they had thought themselves not capable. The program 
helped renew general interest in higher education, especially in technical fields like 
engineering amongst both men and women. Before the war and the ESMWT program 
female engineers had been rare and a curiosity, but with dozens or even a hundred women 
appearing in the engineering departments it showed educators that “women could enter 
engineering in significant numbers” and that they could succeed.81 More generally, the 
number of total engineering undergraduates rose to 230,000 in 1947 which was 10 percent 
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of the entire enrollment across higher education that year and no doubt was influenced 
both by the success of the engineering portion of the ESMWT and the G.I. Bill. 8283  
G.I. Bill and Industry 
Even before the end of the war the United States was preparing itself for possible 
future conflicts and it was clear that strong scientific and industrial power of a nation 
would be critical for success in modern warfare. This is likely a reason why the 
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, or the G.I. Bill included such generous financial 
assistance for veterans seeking advanced education. The ESMWT program had also 
fostered a close relationship between the higher education institutions and the 
government which no doubt helped pave the way for federally sponsored education. The 
pattern set by the ESMWT program saw institutions retaining their fundamental 
autonomy while training personnel using federal funds and that this method produced 
strong results. The G.I. Bill likely included these educational benefits because, among other 
programs, the ESMWT had shown “adults can be educated and that such education 
pays”.84 The G.I. Bill was not just a reward for returning veterans thanking them for their 
service, but it was an investment by the government into the population. The ESMWT 
program was a three-part relationship between higher education, the federal government, 
and industry. While the G.I. Bill was primarily a relationship between the first two, 
industry also benefited from the educational benefits. The wartime industrial efforts had 
revitalized the economy which had before been slowly recovering from the Great 
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Depression. Corporations made massive profits as “merchants of death” and even those 
not directly involved in munitions and weapons were able to buy former GOCO facilities 
for a fraction of the price they were built for. It was clear to industries, given the results of 
the ESMWT training on their employees, that “the colleges can conduct the kind of courses 
needed by industry, more effectively than industry can conduct them for itself, and with 
less interference with production”.85  
Conclusion 
People, industry, and higher education had all answered the nation’s call for 
mobilization and worked together for a common purpose. Individuals benefited through 
the knowledge gained by schooling and were given purpose and a way to assist their 
nation in war, even without wielding a weapon. Women were able to prove themselves in 
technical and scientific fields which they had previously been scoffed at for even 
considering. Corporations and industry worked with the federal government to create the 
Arsenal of Democracy and a dual victory was achieved monetarily and in war. Industries 
were able to train their employees through universities and colleges utilizing federal 
funding to increase the output and efficiency of their factories.  
Higher Education was finally able to achieve its past goal of assisting in the war 
effort and proving that it was necessary for defense. In return, the universities and 
colleges received millions of dollars worth of equipment for free and through their 
training, helped spark a new interest in schooling for millions of Americans. This in 
addition to the G.I. Bill led to record enrollments in the years following WW2. Even though 





learned through further study of it remain as relevant today as they were then. The 
ESMWT program was an experiment which saw unprecedented success in almost every 
way. Each component which took part in the program experienced both tangible and often 
unseen gains. The United States had actively learned from its past failures and, in a time of 
great need, created a program which positively impacted everything it touched. If the need 
for a similar program should ever arise again, then there is no better example to follow 
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